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Four Challenges to Epistemic Scientific
Realism—and the Socratic Alternative*
Timothy D. Lyons†
Pivotal to epistemic scientific realism is the no-miracles argument (NMA):
the success of our scientific theories would be miraculous were they not
at least approximately true. It is this argument that justifies believing the
meta-hypothesis that our successful theories are at least approximately true.
There are essentially four challenges, two primary and two secondary, to
NMA and the realist’s meta-hypothesis. Revealing the individual force of each
challenge, as well as the relations between them, requires a set of clarifications
that depart from the common interpretations of those challenges. (The
arguments for each point made here are detailed in the cited texts.)
A primary challenge is the historical argument, central to which is a list of
theories that are successful but cannot, by present lights, be approximately
true. Those that challenge contemporary realism—including sophisticated
variants of the meta-hypothesis and of NMA—can be found in Lyons (2002,
2006, 2016a). The inference from such a list is not an induction to the
falsity of our current theories; it is a logically valid modus tollens that shows
that the realist’s meta-hypothesis is false. In that case, it cannot even be
accepted as a ‘fallible’ or ‘defeasible’—let alone a ‘likely’—conjecture. That
conclusion is one dimension of the modus tollens. The second dimension,
however, is that the list of “miracles”—a list of successes left inexplicable
by realists—reveals the falsity of the sole premise of NMA, rendering wholly
unacceptable the sole justification for believing the realist meta-hypothesis.
(See Lyons 2002, 2006, 2015.) With the modus tollens in place, it becomes
clear that any persuasiveness of NMA is merely psychological, and here is
one respect in which increasing the quantity of items on the list becomes
important: doing so proportionally destroys any psychologically residual
hope realists cling to for NMA and so for justifiably believing their false
meta-hypothesis. (In Lyons [2016a], I also show that a weakened statistical
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version of the epistemic realist’s meta-hypothesis—“it is statistically likely
that our successful theories are approximately true”—suffers the same fate.)
In advance of considering the other primary challenge, there are two
secondary but notable challenges—both of which have suffered recent neglect.
The first is that there are alternative non-realist meta-explanations for
success. Since the antirealist refrains from believing best explanations,
what is key to the alternative is its ability to defuse NMA, in which
case the alternative need not be better. Nonetheless, if it is better, it
also blocks the weaker—but, apparently, only other—realist justificatory
retreat, the inference that approximate truth provides, not the only, but
the best explanation of success. One non-realist meta-explanation is “modest
surrealism”: the mechanisms postulated by the theoretical system would,
if actual, bring about the relevant phenomena observed, and some yet
unobserved, at time t; and these phenomena are brought about by actual
mechanisms in the world (Lyons 2002, 2003). The availability of such
alternatives ties back to the historical modus tollens: insofar as they can
explain the counterinstances, they have far greater breadth than the realist
meta-explanation.
The other secondary threat bears directly on the comparison of
competing meta-explanations, but it challenges the capacity of the realist’s
meta-explanation to make what it purports to explain, success, “a matter of
course”. Otherwise untapped is the fact that this argument can be leveraged
against the historical modus tollens, whose list is one of successes that are
inexplicable for realism: diluting approximation to accommodate the list
makes approximate truth so vacuous as to fail to render success likely. While
narrowing approximate truth eliminates its touted explanatory breadth,
increasing its permissiveness destroys its explanatory strength. Either way,
whether because of counterinstances or vacuity, the realist is unable to
explain success, so unable to offer the best, let alone the only, explanation
(see Lyons 2003, 2016b).
The other primary challenge to epistemic realism is the argument from
underdetermination, its central premise being a competitor thesis at the
level of scientific theorizing. Take “competitor” to denote an alternative
that shares the confirmed predictions of our favoured theory—including
alternatives that are otherwise predictively distinct—and whose approximate
truth would render our favoured theory patently false. The competitor
thesis properly construed is, “there are competitors whose approximate truth
we cannot justifiably deny.” Like the historical threat, this thesis can be
evidentially supported: there are syntactic relations between historically
successful scientific theories and theoretically non-approximating current
theories that can be, for any favoured theory, re-instantiated to reveal genuine
competitors (not mere “Cartesian fantasies”). And, since science itself accepts
Spontaneous Generations 9:1(2018) 147
T.D. Lyons Four Challenges to Epistemic Scientific Realism
the original instantiated relations, the purported lack of the competitors’
explanatory virtues cannot suffice to deny the approximate truth of those
competitors. With the competitor thesis secured in this empirical way, and
insofar as epistemic realism entails the denial of that thesis (Lyons 2009,
2014, 2015), it follows that epistemic realism is false: it is not the case that
we can justifiably believe that our successful theories are approximately true.
Moreover, the indefinitely many competitors qualify as empirically informed
but ultimately ahistorical counterinstances in the modus tollens. Not only
must the NMA be rejected outright, but we also have an explanation for the
original list: those historical counterinstances were among the indefinitely
many non-approximating theories that, like our current theories, share the
range of successes they achieved (see Lyons 2015). (Tying this into the
challenge of non-realist meta-explanations, one can take this as a syntactic
expression of the modest surrealist’s, semantic, meta-explanation.)
With these four interlocking challenges clarified, a serious threat to
epistemic scientific realism emerges. My proposed alternative (2005, 2011,
2012, 2015, 2016a, forthcoming) is a non-epistemic, purely axiological—or,
as I’ve called it, Socratic—scientific realism. Against antirealists such as
van Fraassen and Laudan, central to this position is a wholly realist, but
refined, meta-hypothesis that retains deep theoretical truth as the aim of
science: in changing its theoretical systems, the scientific enterprise seeks,
not truth per se, but an increase in a particular subclass of true claims, those
whose truth—including deep theoretical truth—is experientially concretized.
For coherence, this axiological meta-hypothesis is directed at the very aim
it describes, and it must live up to what it demands. The following four
points are among those that bear on its promise. First, the threats above,
minimally, have forced epistemic realists to narrow their meta-hypotheses to
only a small class of constituents achieving rare success; most of what goes
on in science is lost. By contrast, liberated from the chains of semantic belief,
the axiological meta-hypothesis is put forward to account for the many and
multi-varied features of science, not only theorizing and theory choices but
high and low level auxiliary modifications, idealizations, experimental design,
theory-laden data selection, etc. Second, irrespective of whether we can say
the postulated semantic goal has been achieved, its achievement entails a
set of syntactically identifiable theoretical desiderata that are agreed to be
central to theory choice: an increase in empirical accuracy and consistency,
and the retention, if not an increase in, breadth of scope, testability, and
three kinds of simplicity. And the quest for that primary goal promotes a
fourth kind of simplicity, along with explanatory depth, the confirmation
of novel predictions, and explanatory power. Third, because the axiological
meta-hypothesis promotes or even requires those eleven desiderata, it can
explain and, crucially, justify their collective pursuit; while, fourth, the posit
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of antirealist goals—say, empirical adequacy, problem solving effectiveness,
or the set taken alone—cannot (see Lyons 2005). Striving to maintain a
Socratic epistemic humility in the quest for truth—seeking truth without
claiming to possess or approximate it—this axiological meta-hypothesis is not
asserted as an object of belief. Rather, in accord with a Socratic scientific
realist treatment of other empirical hypotheses, it is offered as a testable
tool for further empirical inquiry. Despite over three decades of unavoidable
epistemic realist retreats, Socratic scientific realism endeavors to provide an
encompassing account of the scientific enterprise.
Timothy D. Lyons
Chair of Philosophy
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